Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), was a United States Supreme Court case about "habeas corpus".
Background.
Darr was already confined at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary when he was summoned to appear in another county where he was tried and sentenced for armed bank robbery. He petitioned the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for "habeas corpus" claiming he could not afford counsel and was not given enough time to prepare witnesses for his defense. He applied for "habeas" without appealing the conviction. His "habeas" petition was denied on the merits.
He then filed in district court without petitioning the United States Supreme Court for certiorari in the state proceeding. He claimed that he did not have access to counsel, time to prepare witnesses and added a new claim that his confession was coerced. The district judge applying the doctrine of comity based on "Ex Parte Hawk" "examined into the merits sufficiently to assure himself that no extraordinary circumstances existed sufficient to justify federal inquiry into the merits...without the exhaustion of all other available remedies".
The Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed.
Opinion of the Court.
The Court affirms the 10th Circuit decision. If a denial of federally-protected constitutional rights is alleged the Supreme Court must be petitioned for "certiorari" before "habeas" relief is sought at the district court unless "exceptional circumstances" are shown.
The "Hawk" doctrine (1944) stated that a petition for "certiorari" presenting the federal question to the Supreme Court was required to exhaust state remedies before the merits of a "habeas" petition would be considered.
Congress authorized federal courts in 28 USC § 2254 to grant "habeas" review when the state process was "ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner". The exhaustion requirement recognized in "Ex parte Hawk" was codified in the 1948 amendment to § 2254: "This new section is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court. (See "Ex parte Hawk", 1944, 64 S. Ct. 448, 321 U. S. 114, 88 L. Ed. 572.)". The Court concluded that the "legislative history of § 2254 reveals no suggestion that the draftsmen intended...to differentiate between exhaustion of state remedies and review in this Court."
Dissent.
The dissent was concerned that "denial of certiorari would in practice attain a significance which the Court is unwilling to give it by candid adjudication".
Subsequent developments.
"Brown v. Allen" unambiguously stated that denial of "certiorari" should not be given weight by district courts considering "habeas" petitions. "Fay v Noia" overruled the requirement to petition the Supreme Court for "certiorari" before "habeas".